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Investor Rights Symposium
Introduction
The Elusive Balance Between Investor
Protection and Wealth Creation
Barbara Black* and Jill Gross**
The enactment of federal securities legislation in the 1930s codified
the principle that investors should be shielded from securities fraud, but
scholars and policymakers continue to debate the appropriate balance
between protecting investors and encouraging capital formation.
Congressional activity of the past decade reflects this tension. In the
1990s, Congress enacted two major pieces of legislation to restrict
securities fraud class actions because of its belief that frivolous class
actions were a drain on entrepreneurism.1 In 2002, after the
Enron/WorldCom et al. corporate scandals, reflecting perhaps a sense
that the earlier legislation had tipped the pendulum too far, Congress
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) with its wide-ranging reforms to
improve corporate reporting and investor decision-making.2
The Pace Investor Rights Project (PIRP), launched in the fall of
20033 as an expansion of Pace Law School's ground-breaking Securities
* James D. Hopkins Professor of Law, Director of Research, Pace Investor Rights Project,
Pace University School of Law. B.A. Barnard; J.D. Columbia.
** Associate Professor of Law, Director of Advocacy, Pace Investor Rights Project, Pace
University School of Law. A.B. Cornell; J.D. Harvard.
1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737; Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
112 Stat. 3227.
2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 15 U.S.C. §§
7201-7266 (2005) (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and Corporate
Responsibility).
3. In the spring of 2003, New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer settled an
enforcement action brought under the Martin Act, New York's securities statute,
involving allegations of "IPO spinning" against a chief executive officer of a public
company. See Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General, Telecom
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Arbitration Clinic,4 seeks to foster increased scholarly interest on topics
related to investor justice in the regulatory, arbitral and judicial arenas.
The Project thus produced the Investor Rights Symposium, which took
place on the grounds of the Judicial Institute at Pace Law School on
March 31 and April 1, 2005, to bring together academics, regulators,
practitioners, investors' advocates and students to explore the precarious
balance between investor protection and wealth creation. The
scholarship that follows in this volume reflects the academic and critical
thoughts of six authors who explore through different lenses the various
obstacles to optimal investor protection in the securities industry.
Securities Regulation
Professor David S. Ruder 5 kicked off the Symposium with a
keynote speech presenting his thoughts on the SEC's dual role of
protecting investors and facilitating wealth creation by maintaining the
Executive Agrees to Give Up IPO Profits (May 13, 2003), http://www.oag.
state.ny.us/press/2003/may/mayl3b_03.html. As part of the settlement, the CEO agreed
to donate $200,000 to Pace University School of Law to support programs of the
Securities Arbitration Clinic (SAC). Pace's SAC used this grant money to launch PIRP,
an expansion of the clinic designed to promote advocacy, research and educational
programs in the area of investor justice. See Press Release, Pace Law School, Pace Law
School Received $200,000 Grant to Launch the Pace Investor Rights Project (Sept. 8,
2003), http://www.law.pace.edu/news/2003/SAC-Sept-2003.html. We conceived and
implemented PIRP due to our perception that no organization advocated for the legal
rights of small, individual investors.
4. In the fall of 1997, Professor Black founded SAC, the first such clinic in the
nation, in response to an initiative by then Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Chairman Arthur Levitt to provide free representation to small investors who had
arbitrable disputes with their brokerage firms and could not otherwise obtain
representation due to the small size of their claims. Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces
Pilot Securities Arbitration Clinic to Help Small Investors-Levitt Responds to Concerns
Voiced at Town Meetings (Nov. 12, 1997), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
pressarchive/1997/97-101.txt. Chairman Levitt's focus on investor protection alerted him
to the lack of fairness in arbitration because small investors, whose claims were too small
to make it cost-effective for a lawyer to take the case, were faring poorly without legal
representation. He concluded that one solution was to use the vehicle of the law school
clinic to deliver legal services to these small investors. Id. The authors currently are co-
directors of the clinic. Since it opened its doors, SAC has represented more than 30
clients, and has obtained recoveries for its clients through awards and settlements totaling
more than $300,000. For a more extensive description of the history and early years of
Pace's clinic, see Barbara Black, Establishing a Securities Arbitration Clinic: The
Experience at Pace, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 35 (2000).
5. William W. Gurley Memorial Professor of Law, Northwestern University School
of Law. Professor Ruder was Chair of the SEC from 1987-89.
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integrity of the capital markets.6 Professor Ruder examined in detail
whether the SEC accounts for and appropriately balances these
competing considerations in the performance of its various functions,
including its rulemaking, enforcement, oversight of securities self-
regulatory organizations (SROs), market regulation and investor
education functions. He concluded that the SEC's pursuit of investor
protection is aligned with the interests of capital formation because
"honest" markets are the best markets. 8 If investors know they will not
be defrauded, the cost of capital will be lower as there will be no reason
to discount for potential dishonesty.
Professor Thomas R. Hurst9 examined the recent regulatory
approach to investor protection by reviewing the noteworthy reforms
implemented by the SEC in the wake of the mutual funds scandals of
2003 and 2004,10 but concluded that much remains to be done. " Mutual
fund expenses remain high, and disclosure of mutual fund expenses is
obtuse and incomplete. Low-cost index funds constitute only about ten
percent of mutual fund assets, despite widespread publicity about their
benefits.
Professor James J. Fishman12 commented that most mutual fund
abuse is in the asset-gathering phase rather than the trading decision
phase, so the greatest need for investor education is in the area of
choosing funds wisely. He suggested more standardized presentations of
criteria such as costs, performance, and allocations.
These criticisms confirm our own observations in the Securities
Arbitration Clinic, where we have noted that many of our small-investor
clients are placed in a variety of expensive mutual funds. We suspect
this demonstrates the conflict of interest between customer suitability
and brokers' incentives to sell certain products. In fact, Professor Hurst
called for sales practice reform requiring brokers to disclose all
6. David S. Ruder, Keynote Speech: Balancing Investor Protections and Capital
Market Operation, 26 PACE L. REV. 39 (2005).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Sam T. Dell Research Scholar Professor, University of Florida, Fredric G. Levin
College of Law.
10. These scandals included allegations of late-trading and market-timing in
enforcement actions brought by the SEC and the New York State Attorney General's
Office against several mutual fund companies.
11. Thomas R. Hurst, The Unfinished Business of Mutual Fund Reform, 26 PACE L.
REV. 133 (2005).
12. Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law.
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compensation they receive from selling funds. 13 In our opinion, many
investors would be better served if, rather than seeking the services of a
broker-dealer, they consulted a fee-paid investment adviser and
purchased low-cost funds on their own. As Professor Hurst wondered,
how can regulators increase the pressure on broker-dealers to make better
mutual fund selections for their customers?
14
Securities Arbitration
As for the arbitration arena, Professor Ruder thought the SEC was
on the "wrong side" of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,15 overruling long-
standing precedent and holding that federal securities law claims were
arbitrable. 16 However, he noted that there has been considerable reform
of the SRO securities arbitration process to protect investors, 17 including
the development of a strong claimants' bar. 18  As a result, Professor
13. Hurst, supra note 11.
14. Id.
15. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). In McMahon, the SEC filed a brief as amicus curiae
urging reversal of the Court of Appeals' holding that federal securities law claims were
not arbitrable. The SEC argued that the 1975 amendments to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 gave it extensive authority to ensure the fairness of securities arbitration. Id.
at 233-34.
16. For a more extensive discussion of the significance of McMahon, see Barbara
Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities
Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 991 (2002). Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote the
dissenting opinion; for an assessment from the vantage point of his law clerk at the time,
see James A. Fanto, Justice Blackmun and Securities Arbitration: McMahon Revisited,
71 N.D. L. REv. 145 (1995).
17. Many of the reforms have been the result of Professor Ruder's work in chairing
an Arbitration Policy Task Force appointed by the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) in 1994, which resulted in the report widely known as the "Ruder
Report." See SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY
TASK FORCE TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES
DEALERS, INC. (1996).
18. The Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association (PIABA) is "a national bar
association whose member attorneys are dedicated to the representation of investors in
disputes with the securities industry." PIABA Home Page, https://secure.piaba.org/
piabaweb/html/index.php (last visited Sept. 7, 2005).
The mission of PIABA is to promote the interests of the public investor in
securities and commodities arbitration by protecting public investors from
abuses in the arbitration process, such as those associated with document
production and discovery; making securities and commodities arbitration as
just and fair as systematically possible; and creating a level playing field for the
public investor in securities and commodities arbitration.
See About PIABA, https://secure.piaba.org/piabaweb/html/modules.php?op=modload
[Vol. 26:27
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Ruder believes that securities arbitration currently is fair to investors., 9
He did express concerns, however, that arbitration awards lack
precedential value,20 and thus the law governing broker-dealers' duties to
their customers has not been developing since McMahon.
21
Certain investors' advocates have challenged Professor Ruder's
view that securities arbitration is fair to investors and have called for
changes in the process.22 Some of those views were expressed to a
House of Representatives subcommittee who, about the time of the
Symposium, conducted a hearing to review the securities arbitration
process. 23  In addition, the SROs are continually reviewing their
arbitration procedures and proposing rule changes to improve the process
for investors.24
At our Symposium, two scholars presented proposals for securities
arbitration reform. Professor Sarah Rudolph Cole25 presented her
&name=Sections&file=index&req viewarticle&artid=56&page=1 (last visited Nov. 18,
2005).
19. See David S. Ruder, Elements of a Fair and Efficient Securities Arbitration
System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1101, 1108 (1998) (arguing that securities arbitration "provides
clear and significant advantages over the civil litigation system"); David S. Ruder,
Securities Arbitration in the Public Interest: The Role of Punitive Damages, 92 Nw. U. L.
REV. 69, 74 (1997) ("[A]ctive SEC oversight of the SRO arbitration system... is an
essential ingredient in assuring a securities arbitration system in the public interest."); see
also Barbara Black, The Eighth James D. Hopkins Lecture: Is Securities Arbitration Fair
to Investors?, 25 PACE L. REV. 1 (2004) (concluding that securities arbitration is a fair
alternative to courts for investors).
20. See, e.g., IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 136 F.3d 537, 543 (7th
Cir. 1998) ("[Alrbitrators' decisions are not intended to have precedential effect even in
arbitration unless given that effect by contract, let alone in the courts.").
21. See Black & Gross, supra note 16, at 1013-26.
22. See, e.g., A Review of the Securities Arbitration System: Hearing Before the
U.S. H. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored
Enterprises, 109th Cong. (Mar. 17, 2005) (testimony of William Francis Galvin),
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/031705wfg.pdf.
23. See A Review of the Securities Arbitration System: Hearing Before the U.S. H.
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, 109th
Cong. (Mar. 17, 2005), http://financialservices.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode
=detail&hearing=362&comm 1 (speakers included representatives of the NASD and
NYSE arbitration forums and the securities industry, investors' advocates, and
academics).
24. See, e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities
Dealers; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4
Thereto to Amend NASD Arbitration Rules for Customer Disputes, 70 Fed. Reg. 36,442
(June 23, 2005) (soliciting public comment on proposed rule change to revise arbitration
code governing customer disputes to make code more understandable for investors).
25. Professor of Law, The Ohio State University, Michael E. Moritz College of
Law.
2005]
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analysis that securities arbitration entails state action and thus requires
due process protections,26 while Professor Peter Bowman Rutledge27
proposed to eliminate arbitrators' immunity.28 Professor Cole's analysis
is constitutionally-based and advocates reforms that more closely equate
arbitration with a judicial proceeding, while Professor Rutledge proposes
a market-based solution that equates arbitrators with professionals with
an interest in marketing their services.
Both scholars' reformist idealism necessarily is tempered a bit by
practical realities. Although Professor Cole's state action argument is
more persuasive when applied to intra-industry arbitrations; as a practical
matter, if her argument prevails, the same due process protections are
likely to be added for customer arbitrations as well, since neither SRO
could justify a fairer procedure just for the industry. Moreover, as
Professor Maureen Arellano Weston2 9 commented, while Professor
Rutledge accurately points out that the lack of arbitrator accountability is
a serious problem, especially with the explosive growth of arbitration,
she does not believe that contractual immunity is workable as investors
have no negotiation power. She thus advocated for qualified immunity
of arbitrators, allowing liability only for gross negligence.
Finally, both reform proposals share a common laudable goal-to
provide incentives for arbitrators to exercise more care in deciding cases.
In particular, Professors Cole and Rutledge both advocate reasoned
awards 3' and favor NASD's recent rule proposal to require arbitrators to
provide reasons for their awards at the request of the customer.32 While
we have serious reservations about NASD's proposal, Professor Cole
supplies the most compelling argument for reasoned awards through her
26. Sarah Rudolph Cole, Fairness in Securities Arbitration: A Constitutional
Mandate?, 26 PACE L. REV. 73 (2005).
27. Assistant Professor, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law.
28. Peter B. Rutledge, Market Solutions to Market Problems: Re-Examining
Arbitral Immunity as a Solution to Unfairness in Securities Arbitration, 26 PACE L. REV.
113 (2005).
29. Associate Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law.
30. Maureen Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Professional
and Mandatory Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449 (2004).
31. See Cole, supra note 26; Rutledge, supra note 28.
32. See NASD, Proposed Rule Change to Provide Written Explanations in
Arbitration Awards Upon the Request of Customers or Associated Persons, Amendment
No. 1, File No. SR-NASD-2005-032, http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService
=SSGET_PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_013542 (last visited Sept. 7, 2005). For
customer disputes, industry parties will not have the same right to request arbitrators to
include written explanations in their awards.
[Vol. 26:27
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discussion of the cognitive psychology-based thought processes of
arbitrators.33
In a robust defense of the NASD forum, George H. Friedman
34
respectfully disagreed with Professor Cole's theory that there is state
action in securities arbitration. He also argued that, even if there were
state action, the forum contains all requisite due process protections and
NASD-DR arbitration is fair as a matter of law and fact. He does
recognize that more empirical data is necessary to determine whether
parties want more professional arbitrators 35-and to confirm his view
that securities arbitration is a fair process.36 The authors have embarked
on just such a study, with results expected in early 2006. 37
Common Law
Focusing on investor rights in the judicial arena, Professor Francis J.
Facciolo 38 traced the complex and somewhat contingent origins of the
duty of best execution, 39 noting that it evolved largely through SEC
activism in creating the shingle theory.40  Professor James A. Fanto
41
33. Cole, supra note 26, at 107-08. For a fuller explanation of our reservations
about the NASD's "explained awards" proposal, see Comment Letter from Jill Gross,
Barbara Black & Melanie Serkin, PIRP, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, SEC (Aug. 5, 2005),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/nasd2005032/bblack6853.pdf.
34. Executive Vice President and Director of Dispute Resolution of NASD Dispute
Resolution, Inc. ("NASD-DR").
35. See Barbara Black, Do We Expect Too Much From NASD Arbitrators?, 2004
SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR No. 7, 1 (Oct. 2004).
36. See George H. Friedman, The Level Playing Field, XI SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR No. 12, 1 (July 2001).
37. Specifically, in response to a 2002 recommendation by Michael A. Perino,
Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law (see Michael A. Perino, Report to
the Securities and Exchange Commission Regarding Arbitrator Conflict Disclosure
Requirements in NASD and NYSE Securities Arbitrations, at 5 (Nov. 2, 2002),
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/arbconflict.pdf), the Securities Industry Conference on
Arbitration (SICA) has commissioned us to conduct an empirical study of the fairness of
securities arbitration. Our study will explore, in particular, investors' perceptions of the
fairness of arbitration and whether arbitrators appear competent to resolve their customer
disputes. See Thirteenth Report of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, at 8
(Oct. 2005), http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/SICA2005.pdf.
38. Assistant Professor, St. John's University School of Law.
39. The duty of best execution refers to the duty by a broker to seek out the best
price, time and market for his or her client's trade.
40. Francis J. Facciolo, A Broker's Duty of Best Execution in the Nineteenth and
Early Twentieth Centuries, 26 PACE L. REv. 155 (2005).
41. Professor and Associate Director, Center for the Study of International Business
Law, Brooklyn Law School.
2005]
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astutely observed that the SEC's successful performance as a "legal
entrepreneur" should send signals to the private bar about available legal
theories that investors' advocates can pursue to protect investors' rights.
In the end, Professor Fanto noted, it will take a combination of
government regulation and increased court receptivity to novel (and not
so novel) legal theories to maximize investors' rights.
Unfortunately, in our view, the reality is that judges have not made
it easy for investors to sue their investment professionals for
misconduct.42 Courts impose a heavy burden on investors to demonstrate
that they acted reasonably and thus were entitled to trust their broker.43
Moreover, since McMahon, there are few opportunities for a reform-
minded judge to advance investor protection in this area, thus making it
unlikely that such court receptivity is forthcoming.
Investor Backlash
With the perspective of several months, the Investor Rights
Symposium seems very well timed. By the spring of 2005, it was
abundantly clear that a backlash against investor protection efforts was
underway. The corporate community was strident in its insistence that
SOX reforms to improve financial reporting were too costly to
implement and were forcing some issuers to opt out of the public
market.4 The expensing of stock options, a major initiative of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board, was stalled.45  The SEC was
subjected to ongoing criticism, including from two of its own
Commissioners, 46  and litigation47 over two of its reforms-the
42. See Black & Gross, supra note 16, at 1035-47; Marc I. Steinberg, Securities
Arbitration: Better for Investors Than the Courts?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1503 (1996).
43. See Black & Gross, supra note 16, at 1037-38.
44. See, e.g., Karen Richardson & Diya Gullapalli, Next SEC Chief Faces Full
Plate of Issues, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2005, at A4 ("[C]ompanies of all stripes have railed
against the time and expense of preparing internal-control reports, even as hundreds of
companies have identified deficiencies in the systems they have in place to prevent
accounting shenanigans.").
45. Id. ("[M]any companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley, still argue against
options expensing, and they have a number of Washington politicians on their side."); see
also Jonathan Weil, Companies Get Reprieve on Expensing Options, WALL ST. J., Apr.
13, 2005, at C3.
46. See, e.g., Letter from Commissioners Glassman and Atkins re: Staff Report on
the Exemptive Rule Amendments of 2004: The Independent Chair Condition (Apr. 29,
2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch050205cagpsa.htm (criticizing SEC staff
report because it provides no justification for the independent chair rule); Paul A. Atkins,
Speech by SEC Commissioner: Remarks Before the SIA Industry Leadership Luncheon
[Vol. 26:27
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registration of advisers to private hedge funds 48 and the requirement that
mutual funds have boards with no less than 75% independent directors
and independent chairs.49 A modest SEC proposal to allow shareholders
the power to nominate directors in limited circumstances 50 was declared
"dead" in the face of assertions that it would cause disruption within
corporate boardrooms. 5' Finally, the concerns of investors' advocates
intensified with the ominous resignation of SEC Chair William
Donaldson and President Bush's nomination of Representative
Christopher Cox, who, it is widely reported,52 played an important role in
the enactment of PSLRA.
The backlash did not play out simply in the political arena. The
consensus among federal appeals courts53 is that the longer statute of
(June 8, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch060805psa.htm (referring to the
hedge fund and the independent chair rules as reflecting "a puzzling willingness to
undertake sweeping regulatory actions without adequate justification"). Another
Commissioner, Roel Campos, was quoted as wondering: "Is it possible to have reform-
in terms of regulation-if it affects and hurts a particular industry that has significant
lobbying power? Can any regulation or reform survive under our system?" See Richard
Hill, Campos Considers Viability of Rules in Era of Lobbying, SEC. L. DAILY, Mar. 18,
2005.
47. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce sued the SEC asserting it had no authority to
adopt the independent chair rule. In June 2005 the D.C. Circuit held that the SEC had the
authority to promulgate the rule, but its failure to consider the costs of the rule violated
the Administrative Procedure Act. Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). On Chair Donaldson's last day at the
SEC, it voted, again by a 3-2 vote, not to modify the rule. Press Release 2005-99, SEC,
SEC Votes to Adopt Securities Act Rule Reform and Shell Company Regulations;
Considers Matters Remanded by the Court of Appeals (July 1, 2005), http://
www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-99.htm. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce sued again.
See Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. SEC, 2005 LEXIS 19602
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (denying petition for a rehearing); see also Richardson & Gullapalli,
supra note 44, at A4 (reporting that hedge funds have sued the SEC over the rule
requiring registration of hedge fund advisers).
48. Rule 203(b) (3)-2, 17 C.F.R. § 203(b) (3)-2.
49. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004).
50. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (Oct. 23, 2003).
51. See, e.g., Detailed Comments of Business Roundtable on the "Proposed
Election Contest Rules" of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/brt122203.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2005); see
also Brett Ferguson, Snow Says SEC Proxy Access Rule 'More Likely to Backfire' Than
Help, SEC. L. DAILY, May 24, 2005 (reporting that "industry experts have called the
proposal 'dead').
52. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon, Michael Schroeder, David Rogers & Diya
Gullapalli, Cox's Nomination to Run SEC Signals a Regulatory Shift, WALL ST. J., June
3, 2005, at A].
53. See Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig. v. Enter. Mortg.
Acceptance Co., 391 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2004); Foss v. Bear Steams & Co., 394 F.3d 540
2005]
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limitations for securities fraud private actions, the only provision of SOX
that directly improves investors' remedies for securities fraud, is not to
be applied retroactively, thus depriving many investors of the
opportunity to recover for injuries incurred because of the corporate
scandals that led to SOX's enactment. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed
the conviction of Arthur Anderson for witness tampering in connection
with the government's investigation of the Enron scandal.54 While the
conviction was overturned because of faulty jury instructions, many
blamed the Department of Justice for the demise of the accounting
firm.55 Finally, while the government has been successful in achieving
convictions in some well-publicized cases of corporate officers and
securities professionals for corporate looting or other misconduct,56 other
prosecutions were unsuccessful 57 and call into question the ability of the
jury system to handle these complex cases. 58
(7th Cir. 2005); In re ADC Telecomms., Inc., 409 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 2005); cf Tello v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275 (11 th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that extension
could be applicable, but declining to decide the question until a more developed record
determined when class members had inquiry notice).
54. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005).
55. See, e.g., Editorial, Arthur Andersen's 'Victory,' WALL ST. J., June 1, 2005, at
A20.
56. E.g., Andrew and Lea Fastow (Enron); John and Timothy Rigas (Adelphia
Communications); L. Dennis Kozlowski and Mark Swartz (Tyco); Bernard Ebbers
(Worldcom); Martin Grass (Rite Aid); Jamie Olis (Dynegy); and Frank Quattrone
(CSFB). See Executives on Trial: Guilty, Not Guilty, Mistrial, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, June
21, 2005, available at http://online.wsj.com/article-print/0,SB 110995911259970823,00.
html (some of these are currently on appeal; it is suggested that, in light of the reversal of
Arthur Andersen's conviction, Quattrone's conviction may be set aside since the jury
instructions were similar).
57. Most notably, a jury acquitted Richard M. Scrushy, former CEO of HealthSouth
Corp., of participating in a $2.7 billion accounting fraud, despite testimony from several
former HealthSouth executives about Scrushy's involvment as well as tape recordings
that implicated him. See Dan Morse, Chad Terhune & Ann Carms, HealthSouth's
Scrushy is Acquitted, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2005, at Al. A few weeks earlier, New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's failure to win a conviction of Theodore Sihpol was
viewed by some as a cautionary tale of prosecutorial over-zealousness. See Kara
Scannell & Arden Dale, Sihpol Verdict Deals a Blow to Spitzer, WALL ST. J., June 10,
2005, at A l (describing acquittal as a "high-profile setback for Mr. Spitzer...").
58. Kozlowski and Swartz were each convicted of 22 counts in June 2005 after their
first trial, which began in October 2003, resulted in a mistrial in April 2004. See Mark
Maremont & Chad Bray, Tyco Trial Jurors Say Defendants Weren't Credible, WALL ST.
J., June 20, 2005, at Al. Scrushy was acquitted of 36 charges, including the first charge
brought under SOX reporting requirements, after a trial that lasted six months, where one
juror was replaced for health reasons after deliberations had begun and the jury
frequently communicated to the judge that it was deadlocked. See Morse, Terhune &
Carrns, supra note 57.
[Vol. 26:27
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Investor Education
Many investors are remarkably unaware of the degree to which they
are responsible for their investment choices, even if those choices were
influenced by their broker, and they are even less aware of basic
principles such as the need for diversification, the degree of risk involved
in equity investing and the lack of a broker's duty to monitor the
investor's account on an ongoing basis absent special circumstances.59
The high level of investor ignorance coupled with the mounting investor
backlash suggests that the greatest hope for investor protection lies in
investor education efforts. The Investor Rights Project has been tackling,
in small ways, the need for more investor education, especially with
respect to conduct that may affect investors' legal rights and
responsibilities. Through grass-roots efforts at local libraries, community
centers and AARP chapter meetings, our staff attorneys have been
presenting seminars to individual investors, mostly elderly, on their legal
rights and responsibilities when opening and maintaining a brokerage
account at a securities firm.
Despite our investor education efforts and our desire to continue
them, we have reservations about their efficacy. Professor Fanto, ever a
passionate observer, despaired from the Symposium audience that after
studying investor education efforts, 60 he too doubted their effectiveness.
Instead, adopting a regulatory model of "conservative paternalism"
looked better and better to him as the only solution to investor ignorance
and abuse. It is significant to us that the Global Analyst Research
Settlement, touted by the regulators and the industry as a panacea for
investor education deficiencies, 61 has led to nothing but political
59. See Applied Research & Consulting LLC, NASD INVESTOR LITERACY
RESEARCH (2003), available at http://www.nasdfoundation.org/surveyexecsum.pdf (last
visited Sept. 7, 2005) (reporting on results of 2003 survey of 1086 investors showing
remarkable lack of knowledge regarding basics of investing). This ignorance is not
limited to unsophisticated investors. See Peter G. Gosselin, Experts Are at a Loss on
Investing, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2005; De Kwiatkowski v. Bear Steams & Co., Inc., 306
F.3d 1293 (2d Cir. 2002) (reversing finding of liability of commodities broker whose
currency trades on behalf of sophisticated investor lost hundreds of millions of dollars).
60. See James A. Fanto, We're All Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature,
Provision and Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 105 (1998).
61. Joint Press Release, SEC, NASD, NYSE, NYSAG & NASAA, Ten of Nation's
Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest
Between Research and Investment Banking-Historic Settlement Requires Payments of
Penalties of $487.5 Million, Disgorgement of $387.5 Million, Payments of $432.5
Million to Fund Independent Research, and Payments of $80 Million to Fund Investor
Education and Mandates Sweeping Structural Reforms (Apr. 28, 2003), http://www.
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infighting, institutional paralysis, and what appears to be a tremendous
waste of time and money.62 In particular, the Investor Education Fund
has disbursed high fees to lawyers and industry personnel to service a
now-defunct entity that accomplished nothing, dollars that could
otherwise have been spent in the trenches, convincing investors-one at
a time if necessary-that securities industry players may not have their
best interests at heart, despite their rhetoric, advertising, and fancy titles.
The complete failure of the SEC's Investor Education Fund crystallizes
the lack of consensus on the best way to help investors.
In light of this backlash, the ideals of the Symposium-to improve
investor justice by highlighting the interplay of private and public law in
areas impacting investors-seem ever more elusive. Only with persistent
investor rights advocacy, through groups such as the Investor Rights
Project, will the voices of average, individual investors be heard.
sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm.
62. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon, What's the Best Way to Invest in Teaching the U.S.
to Invest?, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2005, at CI (reporting on the dispute between federal
and state securities regulators on how to spend the $55 million in investor education
funds set aside by the analyst settlement); Randall Smith & Ian McDonald, Frustrating
Venture: SEC Education Fund to Lose Top Figures, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2005, at Cl
(reporting on resignation of leaders of SEC's investor education entity set up with analyst
settlement funds); see also Application of Plaintiff SEC for Order Approving New
Investor Education Plan, 03 Civ. 2937 (WHP) (on file with authors) (seeking approval
from federal district court to dissolve SEC's Investor Education Fund and to instead
utilize already-existing NASD Investor Education Foundation to administer investor
education monies, and notifying court of need to reimburse Investor Education Fund for
its expenses).
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